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OIL SHALE, TAR SANDS, AND THE
DEFINITION OF A MINERAL: AN OLD
PROBLEM IN A NEW CONTEXT
Debra Dobray*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last year, our nation witnessed a sharp decline in the cost of
fuel. As a result, domestic production has been curtailed. Many "strip-
per" wells, wells which are not economically successful, have been
capped. Arguably, those potential fuel sources will be lost forever.
Although the oil and gas industry is currently experiencing an economic
downturn, it is imperative that our nation proceed with the development
of energy resources for several reasons. The political and military insta-
bility of the Middle East oil-producing nations could result in a supply
shortage similar to the shortage which occurred in the 1970's. A disrup-
tion in the supply of oil imports could cause serious problems in our
domestic economy and for our national security. Independence from for-
eign energy sources would avert these potential problems. Additionally,
increased domestic production, coupled with a decrease in foreign im-
ports, would diminish our current trade deficit. Presently, many national
leaders advocate exporting coal and Alaskan oil to Japan and other
* Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University; B.A., 1977, University of Texas;
M.P.A., 1982, University of Texas at Austin; J.D., 1982, University of Texas School of Law at
Austin. The author would like to thank Ms. Stacy Grove for her assistance in the preparation of this
article.
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energy-hungry nations of newly industrialized East Asia. I Expanding
production could also alleviate some domestic unemployment and
strengthen the tax base in the areas where the industry is located.
Oil shale and tar sands represent significant sources of fuel for the
United States. The development of these sources will be thwarted some-
what by the dissolution of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. However,
these valuable resources should not be forgotten, capped like stripper
wells. Domestic shale production has the potential to exceed import
levels for decades. It is a secure domestic resource which could free the
nation from dependence on foreign oil in the future.2 As a practical mat-
ter, our nation must not be short-sighted. An energy crisis was an un-
predicted event in the 1970's. Such a crisis could redevelop as quickly as
the price of oil has declined.
Our legal system should be prepared to meet this challenge as well.
One potential legal problem on the horizon in the development of oil
shale and tar sands is the classification of ownership rights. There has
been much controversy and litigation surrounding the definition of a
mineral when the mineral estate has been severed and exists indepen-
dently from the surface estate. The question of who owns a particular
substance, the mineral or surface estate owner, often arises in the devel-
opment of that substance.
II. THE NATURE, EXTENT, AND DEVELOPMENT OF OIL SHALE AND
TAR SAND DEPOSITS
Oil shale is a solid material which contains an organic substance,
kerogen, which can be converted to a liquid through the application of
heat.' Tar sands are consolidated or unconsolidated rocks which contain
some form of bituminous material which can be separated from the
sand.4 The United States supported an oil shale industry until the devel-
opment of the oil well as a low cost means of fuel production in the mid-
1. See Lachica, Reagan May Sell Alaskan Crude to the Japanese, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at
26, col. 4.
2. D. RUBENSON & R. PEI, OIL SHALE IN THE PICEANCE BASIN, AN ANALYSIS OF LAND
USE ISSUES (1983) [hereinafter cited as RUBENSON]. One tar sands project of the Greenwich Oil
Company in north Texas could add 10 billion barrels of crude to the nation's reserves by the end of
the year. Landers, Synthetic Fuels Endeavor Leaves Undetermined Legacy, The Dallas Morning
News, Jan. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
3. RUBENSON, supra note 2, at 1-2.
4. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON NATURAL RESOURCES, SURFACE MIN-
ING OF NON COAL MINERALS, APPENDIX II: MINING AND PROCESSING OF OIL SHALE AND TAR
SANDS, 148 (1980) [hereinafter cited as APPENDIX II].
(Vol. 22:1
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nineteenth century.- Several other countries, such as Scotland, Spain,
Sweden, France, and Australia, have also had oil shale industries. The
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China still produce shale oil com-
mercially, some of which is refined to produce liquid fuels, and some of
which is burned as a solid to generate electric power.6
Oil shale deposits blanket a large part of the United States. The
Black Devonian Mississippi oil shales cover about 17,000 square miles in
the Ohio, Michigan, and Appalachian Basins, and contain a potential
yield of four hundred billion barrels of oil.' The richest shales are in the
Green River formation of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming." This three-
state area has an estimated production yield of two trillion barrels of oil.9
The richest tar sands are in Utah, and contain an estimated production
yield of two billion barrels of oil.10
The federal government owns approximately eighty percent of the
western shale lands.1 The remaining lands are owned by states, Indian
tribes, and private interests. 2 Most of the privately owned property is
controlled by oil companies. 3 The primary companies involved in oil
shale development are Chevron, Occidental Petroleum, Tenneco, and
Connoco or their oil shale company subsidiaries.' 4 The development of
privately owned shale lands might be more lucrative and practical now
5. RUBENSON, supra note 2, at 2.
6. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY 346 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY].
7. Booz * ALLEN & HAMILTON INC., SURVEY OF EASTERN OIL SHALE ISSUES AND ACTIvI-
TIES (1980) [hereinafter cited as SURVEY]. The shales of the greatest economic significance, because
of their high oil content, are in Kentucky and central Tennessee. Other eastern states with shale
deposits include Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Alabama, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and
New York. The Pennsylvania and New York shales, however, yield small smounts of oil per ton of
shale. Generally, the eastern shales are thin deposits spanning large areas of land. As a result, a
commercial size mining facility would have to be quite large. Nevertheless, if developed, these shales
could be a valuable source of light petroleum products given their chemical content. Id.
8. CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 333.
9. Duncan, Oil Shale Mining Claims: Alternatives for Resolution of an Ancient Problem, 17
LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 5 (1982). However, some experts speculate that the Wyoming deposits
are of insufficient quality to be developed economically. RUBENSON, supra note 2, at 5.
10. APPENDIX II, supra note 4, at 159. Other principal tar sand states are Alabama, California,
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, and Utah. However, there are still techno-
logical problems which preclude tar sand development in the near future and lead some analysts to
conclude that the estimated yield is inflated. Id. at 158.
11. Israel, Colorado Oil Shale Development in the 1980's, 9 CoLo. LAW. 2077 (1980).
12. APPENDIX II, supra note 4, at 50.
13. The key issue in such "control," however, is: What do the companies own? Chevron owns
a substantial amount of the acreage in fee although some of the acres are mineral only or surface
only properties. Letter from G. E. Bishop, Chevron Shale Oil Company, to author (October 25,
1985) (discussing Chevron Shale Oil Properties). Such partial ownership could result in ownership
rights disputes when these properties are developed. See infra notes 50-111 and accompanying text.
14. Other major companies involved in the development of western shales include Mobil, Supe-
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given the current regulations applicable to federal lands which limit the
lease size, prohibit off-site waste disposal, and restrict each developer to
one lease.15 Private parties own the majority of the eastern shales which
cover a vast area.
Oil from shale is produced by a six step process. The shale must be
mined, crushed, hauled, retorted, upgraded, and finally transported. Sur-
face mining methods such as strip mining and open pit mining are appro-
priate when shale is near the surface. 6 Tar sands also may be developed
through surface mining. 7 Underground mining is another alternative, of
which room and pillar mining is the traditional method. 18 After being
mined, the shale is fractured to increase the efficiency of the retorting
process, and then hauled to the retort site.19 Retorting involves ex-
tracting oil from shale through the application of heat. Often this pro-
cess is conducted at the surface.2" However, alternate methods of
production are becoming available as well. In the modified in situ ap-
proach, a fraction of the oil shale is mined by an underground method
and the remaining is crushed into rubble with explosives to create perme-
ability, thus allowing the rubble to be retorted in place.2" True in situ
retorting involves placing explosives in the shale seam by wells, detonat-
ing the explosives, and retorting the shale in place horizontally.22 After
rior, Exxon, Arco, Texaco, Shell, Union, Sohio, and Getty. Lewis, Oil from Shale: The Potential, the
Problems, and a Plan for Development, 5 ENERGY 373, 374-75 (1980).
15. See RUBENSON, supra note 2, at 14-35. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 governs the
development of federally owned land. A full discussion of its provisions and their application to oil
shale is beyond the scope of this article. However, just as this legislation tends to restrict developers
to a degree, the government has at its power the means of encouraging the resource's development
through tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation and investment and production tax credits,
purchase agreements, and loan guarantees. CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 348.
16. SYNTHETIC FUELS CORPORATION, COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY REPORT (1985) [hereinaf-
ter cited as REPORT]. In either process, first the topsoil is removed, then the overburden is removed
generally through drilling or blasting. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, GUIDE
TO OIL SHALE (1981) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
17. Tar sands in Canada are produced through surface mining. This method is less expensive
than undergroud mining and is feasible where the overburden is not too thick. APPENDIX II, supra
note 4, at 157-158.
18. This technique involves the excavation of underground tunnels. GUIDE, supra note 16, at 4.
Eastern shales may be recoverable only by using underground methods. SURVEY, supra note 7, at
11-3.
19. GUIDE, supra note 16, at 6. Hoists, conveyors, rail systems, pipelines, and trucks are suita-
ble for hauling oil sale depending on the terrain. Id.
20. Id. at 7.
21. CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 341. See also GUIDE, supra note 16, at 5; RE.
PORT, supra note 16, at 32-33; APPENDIX II, supra note 4, at 157.
22. REPORT, supra note 16, at 33. In situ retorting is a difficult process because of the shale's
low permeability. However, if it can be accomplished successfully, it alleviates many of the problems
of mining, particularly in disposing of the waste. CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 341.
Other experimental methods of in situ retorting are the microwave heating of oil shale and the
[Vol. 22:1
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retorting, the shale oil must be upgraded before it can be used as a substi-
tute for crude oil. 3 Several problems emerge in conjunction with this
total process. Since shale and tar sands expand when retorted, there is a
great volume of spent material which must be discarded. 4 Moreover,
the process requires a large amount of water along with a substantial
capital investment in facilities.
Examining the process of producing oil from shale helps to depict
the resource's characteristics. In what other ways can the substance's
qualities be explained? Basically, oil shale is a sedimentary rock contain-
ing organic material from which oil can be produced.25 However, it does
not really contain petroleum, nor is it necessarily a true shale. The en-
ergy source it yields is a black, waxy oil which in addition to carbon and
hydrogen, contains nitrogen, oxygen, and sulphur.26 Western shale is in
fact a marlstone, or type of limestone, composed of calcium, magnesium
carbonates, dolomite, and quartz.27 In contrast, eastern shale is a true
marine shale composed of iron, aluminum, potassium, magnesium, and
silicon clay.28 Other minerals found in association with shale, and which
may be recoverable, are dawsonite, a source of aluminum, and nahcolite,
a source of soda ash.29 Additionally, eastern shales have the potential to
yield cobalt, nickel, and uranium. 3° Thus, oil shale contains minerals
and its end product after refinement is oil fuel. In another sense, though,
shale is merely a conglomeration of rocks, large amounts of which must
be crushed and processed in order to yield oil and other mineral by-prod-
ucts.31 Is shale then, legally, a part of the mineral or the surface estate?
injection of steam into tar sands. See REPORT, supra note 16, at 33; APPENDIX II, supra note 4, at
155-157. Another process particularly suitable for eastern shales has been tested recently. This
process, "hytort," involves retorting the shale in a hydrogen, rather than the conventional air envi-
ronment. If successful on a large scale, it could greatly enhance organic carbon recovery. See SUR-
VEY, supra note 7, at 111-20.
23. RUBENSON, supra note 2, at 3. Refining crude shale oil is more costly than petroleum crude
because of the former's high nitrogen content. CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 342, 345.
24. McCloskey, The Environmental Impacts of Synthetic Fuels, 2 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1, 8-9
(1981).
25. Duncan, supra note 9, at 4.
26. Jaffee, 5 Mineral Industries Bulletin (Colorado School of Mines 1962). Tar sands, on the
other hand, actually are rocks impregnated with oil. Id. Query whether for purposes of determining
if either resource belongs to the mineral or surface estate, this distinction should be significant. See
notes 46-47 infra and accompanying text.
27. Duncan, supra note 9, at 4.
28. SURVEY, supra note 7, at 1-11.
29. Israel, supra note 11, at 2089. See also CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 342.
30. See SURVEY, supra note 7.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
1986]
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An examination of how courts have classified other substances similar to
shale will aid in an attempt to resolve this question.
III. A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATIONS
OF SIMILAR SUBSTANCES
From a legal perspective, it is important to classify shale as being a
part of either the mineral or the surface estate for the purpose of deter-
mining ownership rights to develop the resource.32 Generally, under the
common law, mines and mining rights belong to the owner of the fee
estate, who may sever the fee and convey or reserve either the surface or
the mineral estate.33 In interpreting such grants or reservations, courts
have not limited the term "minerals" to metallic substances. 34 Although
some state statutes provide limited guidance to courts called upon to in-
terpret the ambiguous term "minerals" in a grant or reservation, 35 often
courts are required to clarify the term with little assistance.
An analysis of how courts have classified substances similar to shale,
tar sands, and their by-products should aid in predicting how courts will
classify shale and tar sands.36 Before shale is mined, crushed, and re-
torted, it is very similar to rock or stone, both of which have been held to
be minerals.37 Western shale, in particular, exhibits qualities similar to
32. For a discussion of other reasons for defining the substance as being a mineral or not being
a mineral, see Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals," 54 N.D.L. REv. 419, 424-26 (1978).
33. In other countries, mines belong to the sovereign. In the United States as well, during
colonial time, the right to mine gold and silver belonged to the sovereign. This exception followed
the "royal mines" doctrine of the common law. Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs: Conflicts Between Sur-
face and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN. MxN. L. INsT. 995, 996-1007 (1980). The ownership
rights of the sovereign under Mexican law was a factor the Texas Supreme Court considered in
deciding whether a reservation of minerals to the state included coal. Schwartz v. State, 703 S.W.2d
187, 190 (Tex. 1986), aff'g 658 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
34. United States ex rel Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Harris, 115 F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1940).
Under the system of land classification used by the government at the beginning of this century,
public lands, which could be conveyed as land grants, were classified as being either mineral or non-
mineral depending on whether the land was more valuable for agricultural or mining purposes. See
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 47-8 (1983). For a discussion of this classification
system, see Reeves, The Origin and Development of the Rules of Discovery, 8 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 1, 21-26, 28-30 (1973). Now there are certain regulations which address the definition of a
mineral under mining laws. However, these provisions are of limited application to this discussion.
35. For a survey of state statutes which have limited the word "minerals" as used in private
conveyaces and in other contexts, see Reeves, supra note 32, at 438-40, 483-89.
36. For a discussion of how specific substances have been classified, see Reeves, supra note 32,
at 463-76. Some substances present in shale, such as carbonate of soda, have been held to be miner-
als. Id. at 476.
37. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E.292, (1932) (pulp stone in-
cluded in conveyance of "all the coal and mineral" [sic]). Other courts have not concluded that rock
is included in a grant of minerals. See Steinman Dev. Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832
(W.D. Va. 1922), aff'd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir. 1923); Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896
(1973); Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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those of limestone, sandstone, and even granite. The decisions are not
uniform regarding whether these substances constitute minerals,3"
although generally courts do not consider them to be included in a grant
or reservation of the mineral estate. Eastern shale is partially composed
of silicon clay, and clay has been held to be a mineral.3 9 Both eastern
and western shales, as well as tar sands, may be likened to sand and
gravel. A broad interpretation of the word minerals would encompass
sand and gravel, yet most judicial interpretations exclude these sub-
stances." However, the Supreme Court held in Watt v. Western Nuclear,
Inc.41 that gravel found on lands covered by the Stock-Raising Home-
stead Act of 1916 is a mineral reserved to the United States under the
act.42
Thus, determining whether shale is a mineral by analogizing it to
38. See, ag., Kalberer v Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 940 (1940) (grant of "all the
minerals of every kind and character" includes sandstone); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.
2d 994 (1949) (limestone not included in a devise of "the mineral rights"); Southern Title Ins. Co. v.
Oller, 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980) (chalk, a form of limestone, not a mineral within the
exclusionary clause of a title insurance policy since its production would destroy the surface); Kinder
v. La Sale County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923) (limestone not included in
deed of "all the rights in or title to the oil and minerals, of every description"); Brady v. Smith, 181
N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963 (1905) ("all mines and minerals" did not include limestone when land was
largely covered with limestone and granite); see also Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R., 150
Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924) (reservation of "all the mines or minerals" does not include limes-
tone which comprised the general surface of the land); Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629
(1928) (limestone not included in a mineral reservation where land located in "limestone country").
But see Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.E. 186 (1895) (granite,
because of its value, included in a grant of "minerals").
39. Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 109 So. 2d 628 (1959) (clay included in grant of"oil, gas
or other minerals" absent evidence that the parties intended to limit the broad term). But see Hans
v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Kan. 478, 241 P.2d 475 (1952) (clay not included in conveyance
of "oil, gas, and other minerals" given the position of the parties and the substance of the
transaction).
40. See, eg., State ex reL Commissioners of Land Office v. Hendrix, 196 Okla. 596, 167 P.2d 43
(1946); LaRowe v. McGee, 171 Ga. 771, 156 S.E. 591 (1931) (case decided on other grounds); State
Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish and Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965); Hendler v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486 (1904); Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954);
Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 164 P.2d 399 (1944); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15
S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (mineral lease); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand
Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947); Harper v. Talladega County, 279 Ala. 365, 185 So. 2d 388 (1966); Bambauer v. Menjoulet,
214 Cal. App. 2d 871, 29 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1963); see also Reeves, supra note 32, at 433-34, 472-73.
But see United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972) (reservation of "all
minerals, including oil and gas," included sand and gravel deposits).
41. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
42. The Court noted that the dictionary meaning of minerals was not useful in resolving the
issue, nor was the scientific classification of gravel as an inorganic substance. Id. at 43. Rather, the
Court resolved that gravel should be treated as a mineral under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916 as it was under the general mining laws. Id. at 59. However, the dissent argued that Congress
did not intend to reserve commonplace inorganic substances that constituted part of the soil of the
patented land. Id. at 71-2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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similar substances previously considered by courts yields no definitive
conclusion. Some courts have addressed the ownership of shale itself, but
again, have reached no uniform resolution.43 The classification of its by-
produts is not settled either. For example, uranium might be recoverable
from eastern shale, but the decisions are not consistent as to whether
uranium should be classified as a mineral.' Courts have not even been
able to agree on the classification of shale's and tar sand's final product,
oil. In interpreting the term "minerals" in a reservation or grant, courts
generally consider oil and gas to be included4 5 even though both sub-
stances are organic and lack a definite chemical composition. However,
unlike the petroleum produced from porous sands, shale oil is solid in its
natural state and must undergo considerable processing before oil is pro-
duced.46 This distinction is the reason it is commonly referred to as a
synthetic fuel.47 While water generally is not considered to be a mineral
nor a part of the mineral estate,48 some courts recently have reasoned
43. See McCombs v. Stevenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907) (absent a contrary intent,
reservation of "all coal, ores and other minerals" included shale, a substance sought and removed for
its intrinsic value). Contra Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W. 2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (reservation
of "oil, gas and other minerals" did not reserve limestone, caliche, or surface shale), writ ref'd.
44. Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973) (reservation of "oil, gas, and kindred minerals"
did not reserve uranium). Contra Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984)
(uranium is held by the owner of the mineral estate as a matter of law). For a consideration of the
Moser case, see infra notes 104-109, 116-117 and accompanying text.
45. See eg., Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), writ ref'd; Elliott v.
Nelson, 113 Tex. 62, 251 S.W. 501 (1923); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex.
574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940). See also Ozark Chemical Co. v. Jones, 125 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942) and cases cited at 6-7 n. 11; Reeves, supra note 32, at 466-67. But see
Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36,47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882) (oil not included in a reservation of all
minerals); Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v Railroads Land Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922) (reserva-
tion of "iron, coal and other minerals" embraced only solid minerals and not oil and gas).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
47. For an interesting analysis of this issue, compare Morgan v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 21
Utah 2d 364, 445 P.2d 776 (1968) with Utah Resources Int'l v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 26 Utah 2d
342, 489 P.2d 615 (1971). In Morgan, the court was faced with the task of interpreting a legislative
amendment. The court enjoined the Board of State Lands from entering into an oil and gas lease
where there was already in existence a "bituminous sand lease," concluding that the oil recoverable
under the bituminous sand lease was the same mineral recoverable under an oil and gas lease. How-
ever, in Utah Resources, the court refused to enjoin the Board from issuing an oil shale lease on land
subject to an "oil, gas and hydrocarbon lease" which excluded oil shale. The court noted an interest-
ing, although somewhat dubious, distinction between petroleum and oil shale:
[1it is evident that oil and gas, and bituminous sands leases have to do with a mineral in
place containing an identical substance, while an oil shale lease does not cover that same
substance, and that two separate minerals are involved. Gas and oil leases historically have
been considered mineral, as have oil shale leases, and we are inclined to the opinion and we
conclude that each is a "license to hunt" for the minerals in their natural state and not a
fishing license for an end product that might be oil, coal oil, synthetic fuel or lubricants,
diamonds, nylons, cosmetics or other items of a purely synthetic nature.
Utah Resources, 489 P.2d at 617.
48. See, ag., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Robinson v. Robbins Petro-
leum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865 (rex. 1973); Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943). How-
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that geothermal steam and its fluid content constitute a mineral because
the function of this resource duplicates that served by oil, gas, and coal.49
Courts might take this approach in determining the nature of oil shale
and include shale in a grant of "minerals".
IV. JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE WORD "MINERALS"
Examining the classfication of substances on a mineral by mineral
basis fails to reveal how courts will treat future controversies concerning
whether oil shale or tar sands belong to the surface or the mineral estate.
Courts often employ rules of construction to reach their ultimate conclu-
sions. Additionally, courts seem to base many of their decisions on prin-
ciples touched by public policy implications. The following discusson
will examine these guidelines with respect to their application to these
new resources.
A. Universal Terms
Generally, courts refuse to view universal terms, such as "all," "of
every kind," "of any kind," or "of every description," which accompany
the word "minerals" in a conveyance, as expanding the mineral estate to
encompass any substance which arguably might be "mineral" in na-
ture. 50 Likewise, a conveyance which uses a combination of such words
as "in," "on," or "under" apparently neither broadens nor restricts the
court's definition."1 On the other hand, courts will use rules of construc-
tion to define the term "minerals" in ambiguous conveyances. In some
cases where the instrument could reasonably be interpreted as either in-
cluding or excluding the substance in question, courts have deferred to
the rule of construction which requires that the instrument be construed
against the grantor,52 although usually this rule is merely an influential
ever, under the Louisiana Mineral Code, which has its genesis in the civil law, subterranean water is
considered a mineral. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.4 (West 1975).
49. See, eg., United States v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
Ottoboni v. United States, 434 U.S. 930 (1977). For a comprehensie discussion of' the classification
of geothermal resources, see Olpin, Tarlock & Austin, Geothermal Development and Western Water
Law, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 773 (hereinafter cited as Olpin).
50. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 477, 481-82.
51. Id. at 479-80.
52. See, eg., McCombs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907); Beury v. Shelton, 151
Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928); Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674
(1924). In Louisiana, a grant or reservation of mineral rights does not create a separate estate, but a
prescriptable servitude, which is in the nature of an easement and can terminate for nonuse. Hence,
Louisiana courts modify this rule and interpret an ambiguous instrument in a way which limits the
1986]
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factor.
B. Ejusdem generis
Courts also use the constructional rule of ejusdem generis to clarify
the word "minerals,""3 but usually confine its use to ambiguous convey-
ances. This rule provides that specific terms in a phrase, such as "oil and
gas," define and limit the general term, "minerals." Ejusdem generis rep-
resents a generic attempt to arrive at the intent of the parties to the con-
veyance. Consequently, other courts refuse to apply the rule, contending
that it fails to illuminate the intent of the parties because various qualities
of the specific term, such as value, use, and composition, could be em-
ployed to limit the general term. 4 The rule's application to oil shale and
rights of the servitude owner. Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 1967), writ ref'd,
250 La. 924, 199 So. 2d 923 (1967). See also McGuify v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154 (1960).
In contrast to private conveyances, legislative grants or reservations tend to be construed in favor of
the government, as grantor. See, eg., Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983); United
States v. Union Pacific R.R, 353 U.S. 112 (1957); Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986).
53. See, ag., Lazy D Grazing Ass'n v. Terry Land and Livestock Co., 641 F. 2d 844 (10th Cir.
1981) (reservation of "gas, casinghead gas, oil and other minerals valuable as a source of petroleum"
includes only minerals which are similar in character to petroleum or which may be converted into
petroleum and not necessarily all minerals serving as depositories for petroleum); Steinman Dev. Co.
v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922) (grant of "all the bituminous coal, iron ore
and all other minerals, and fire clay" does not include all the sand, rock, shale, water, and earth to be
found on premises); Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroads Lands Co., 151 La.197, 91 So. 676 (1922)
(oil and gas not included is a reservation of "iron, coal, and other minerals); Cronkhite v. Falken-
stein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960) (gypsum not included in reservation of "oil, gas and other miner-
als"); compare Allen v. Farmers Union Coop. Royalty Co., 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975) (ejusdem
generis applied to determine that a reservation of "all oil, gas and mineral rights" did not convey
rights to gold, silver, copper or other metallic ore); with Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunning-
ham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971) (copper, silver, and gold not included in a grant of "oil, gas, coal
and other minerals" although ejusdem generis not needed to ascertain the intent of the parties as the
granting clause was unambiguous). In appropriate circumstances, courts employ ejusdem generis to
interpret legislative grants or reservations of minerals. State Land Bd. v. State Dept. of Fish &
Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965) (reservation to state of "coal and other minerals" did
not include sand and gravel which lacked extraordinary value and were not mined in the traditional
sense); cf. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983) (express listing of coal in a reservation
clause was not intended to limit the phrase "other minerals" given legislative history).
54. See Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) where the court observed:
If we should appy the rule of ejusdem generis, what qualities or peculiarities of the specified
type, "coal," shall be considered in determining the classification intended by the use of the
word "mineral"? Are we to classify according to value? If so, can it be said that oil or gas
on the one hand and coal on the other are of different kinds or species of minerals? If we
classify as to use, is it not true that all three are used for fuel? Shall the classification be
determined by the form, density, color, weight, value, or uses of the particular species
mentioned? Taking either value, use, or nature of origin as the basis of the classification
mentioned, can we say that oil and coal do not belong to the same class? It is true that coal
in its commercial form is found in a solid state, while oil is a liquid. But are we justified in
limiting the minerals intended to be included in the reservation to those only which are
found in a solid state? Such evident difficulty in applying the rule of ejusdem generis to the
terms of the reservation under consideration renders it an unsafe guide, and we do not
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tar sands illustrates the validity of this criticism." For example, should
oil shale be included in a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals"
because it produces a substance used for fuel? Or, should it be excluded
because it is not a liquid hydrocarbon, but is solid, and must be mined?
C. Parole Evidence
In order to establish the subjective intent of the parties to an ambig-
uous conveyance of minerals, some courts will allow the introduction of
parole evidence which details facts peculiar to the transaction in ques-
tion. 6 Additionally, some courts admit extrinsic evidence of the general
circumstances surrounding the transaction 7 in an effort to determine the
objective intent of the parties. For example, courts may use evidence
that a reasonable person in the area at the time of the conveyance com-
monly viewed the substance as either being an integral part of the land,58
or as being a mineral, 9 or as being incapable of commercial exploita-
believe any aid in the interpretation of the terms used in the reservation will be afforded by
such rule.
Id. at 1099. See also Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (rex.
1964), aff'd, 396 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Reeves, supra note 32, at 447-449.
55. See also Note, Minerals: Moser v. United States Steel A New Approach to Ownership of
Unspecified Minerals in Texas and Oklahoma, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 352, 368-69 (1984) (Oklahoma
should abandon the rule of ejusdem generis because the multitude of possible classifications to define
the general character of minerals is too arbitrary to be useful).
56. See, ag., Kalberer v. Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 940 (1940) (evidence that grantor
accepted as consideration some stock in grantee's corporation engaged in the exploitation of stone
admitted to establish that a sandstone rock quarry was conveyed in grant of "all the minerals...
except coal and natural gas and coal oil"); Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 243, 57 N.E.2d
598 (1944) (evidence that original grantee was engaged exclusively in the mining of coal admitted to
establish that oil and gas were not conveyed in deed of "all the coal and fireclay and minerals");
United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972) (letter written by purchaser
subsequent to purchase admissible to explain "all minerals" as used in a reservation). Some courts
stress that resort to extrinsic evidence of such subjective intent is appropriate only when the instru-
ment is ambiguous. Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800,
127 A.L.R. 1217 (1940); Wall v. Shell Oil Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 504. 25 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1962). But
cf New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp 767 (D.N.M.), appeal dismissed, 239 F.2d
645 (10th Cir. 1956). In Elkins, the district court barred the admission of extrinsic evidence to show
the circumstances surrounding the deed or the intent of the parties at the time. Id. at 769. The
court dubiously concluded that the language in the deed unequivocally established that uranium and
thorium were included in a reservation of "all oil, gas and minerals." Id. at 770.
57. Thus, in interpreting a conveyance, courts may consider not only the language of the con-
veyance, but also the circumstances surrounding its execution. United States ex reL Tennessee Val-
ley Auth. v. Harris, 115 F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1940); Houghton v. Thompson, 57 Wyo. 196, 115
P.2d 654 (1941). However, if the instrument is sufficiently clear on its face, courts should refrain
from such considerations. Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo. 1973).
58. Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, _ 270 P.2d 190, 192 (1954) (Reservation of "all mineral
and mineral rights" does not include gravel when the entire surface of the area was nothing but sand
and gravel); Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928) (reservation of "all the metals and
minerals" did not include limestone cropped out on almost the entire tract of land).
59. See, e.g., Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 89 Mich. 180, 50 N.W. 807 (1891)
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tion ° in order to determine the objective intent of the parties. In con-
trast, other courts refuse to impute the reasonable neighbor's knowledge
to the parties involved in the transaction61 because a lack of knowledge
as to the existence of the substance does not necessarily preclude its con-
veyance.6" Using parole evidence to ascertain whether or not oil shale or
tar sands are included in an ambiguous conveyance of minerals would
produce unpredictable results dependent upon circumstances surround-
ing the particular transaction or the general circumstances surrounding
the understanding of minerals in the community.63
D. Intrinsic Value
Rather than concluding that a substance is a mineral if it was actu-
ally known to exist or to be capable of economic production in a given
area, some courts concentrate on the intrinsic value of the substance it-
self. Absent an express limitation in the instrument, this analysis defines
a substance as being a mineral if it has value or is special apart from the
soil," notwithstanding that its presence was unknown or its extraction
(marble and serpentine not included in reservation of minerals since neither was known to exist in
the country and the only valuable mineral previously developed was iron); Southern Title Ins. Co. v.
Oller, 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980) (limestone not a mineral as there was no evidence that
chalk or limestone was generally known or regarded in the area as being a mineral); Missouri Pac.
Ry. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941) (oil and gas not included in a reservation of
"all coal and mineral deposits" because oil and gas were not commonly recognized as minerals when
deed executed).
60. See, eg., Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., of Ky., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59
A.L.R.3d 1137 (1973) (Even though coal was known to exist in the area, it was not thought commer-
cially recoverable, nor was there any evidence of the leasing or purchasing of coal rights in the area.
Hence, coal was excluded from grant of "oil, gas and other minerals"); Kinder v. La Salle County
Carbon Coal Co., 310 111. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923) (limestone not included in grant of "all the rights
... to the oil and minerals, of every description" because the grantees apparently did not interpret
the deed as conveying limestone until it became valuable); White v. Sayers, 101 Va. 821, 45 S.E, 747
(1903) (because market for coal unavailable at time "minerals" granted, it had no commercial value
and was not conveyed); Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942) (gravel
not included in reservation of "all the mineral, oil and gas rights" because there was no evidence the
property was considered valuable for its gravel and sand).
61. Kentucky Diamond Mining & Developing Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141
Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910) (fact that parties may not have had diamonds in mind does not affect a
broad conveyance of "all the minerals"); New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp, 767
(D.N.M. 1956) (immaterial whether parties knew that uranium and thorium were present on land in
reservation of "oil, gas and minerals" because both substances are minerals in the scientific, geologi-
cal, and practical sense).
62. Stowers y. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969, 971 (4th Cir. 1934); Western Dev. Co.
v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955); Barden v. Northern Pac. Ry., 154 U.S. 288 (1894).
63. Dependence upon such conjecture tends to stifle the development of these resources. See
Duncan, supra note 9, at 39-40 (unpatented shale mining claims).
64. The West Virginia Supreme Court enunciated this "special value" rule as follows:
The term "mineral," when employed in conveyancing in this state, is understood to in-
cluded every inorganic substance which can be extracted from the earth for profit, whether
12
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unprofitable at the time of the conveyance. Using this interpretation,
courts generally do not treat substances such as sand, clay, gravel, and
limestone as being included in a grant or reservation of minerals, even
though they could be produced commercially, because these substances
possess no rare or exceptional characteristics.65 Some courts, however,
attach a caveat to this generalization and may classify such substances as
minerals if they exhibit distinctive qualities,66 contain valuable materi-
als,67 or are scarce in the area.68 How might shale oil or tar sands be
characterized under this special value rule and its proviso? Oil shale and
tar sands certainly share many characteristics with ordinary gravel, sand,
clay, and limestone which are commercially produced.69 Moreover, be-
cause oil shale contains kerogen which must be processed, and not oil, it
is arguably not special or valuable apart from the soil.70 Alternatively,
courts might view its hidden wealth as a unique attribute, and hence,
classify it as a mineral.
Courts use the ejusdem generis rule, parole evidence, and the special
value rule in an effort to ascertain how parties defined minerals in a
vague conveyance. Of course, if the true intent of the parties can be
gleaned from the four corners of the instrument, resort to these tools
should not be necessary. Arguably, what mineral rights the parties to a
lease intended to convey is easier to ascertain from the instrument itself
than what mineral rights the parties to a deed intended to convey, be-
it be solid, as stone, fire clay, the various metals and coal, or liquid, as, for example, salt
and other mineral waters and petroleum oil, or gaseous, unless there are words qualifying
or limiting its meaning, or unless from the deed, read and construed as a whole, it appears
that the intention was to give the word a more limited application.
Horse Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W.Va. 616, -, 95 S.E. 26, 27 (1918).
65. See, eg., Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 164 P.2d 399 (1944) (gravel); Heinatz v. Allen,
147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) (limestone); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962) (limestone), writ refd. But cf Watt v. Western Nuclear Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983). In
Watt, the court held that gravel was included in a statutory mineral reservation because it could be
removed from the soil and used for commercial purposes. Id. at 55. However, Watt involved the
interpretation of a reservation of minerals in a Congressional grant of homestead lands for the lim-
ited purposes of ranching and farming.
66. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 209 Pa. 256, _, 58 A. 486, 487 (1904), overruled on other
grounds, Hall v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R., 270 Pa. 468, -, 113 A. 669, 670 (1921).
67. Bambauer v. Menjoulet, 214 Cal. App. 2d 871, 29 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1963).
68. State Land Bd. v. State Dept. of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, _, 408 P.2d 707, 708-09
(1965) (statutory reservation).
69. Because oil shale constitutes a substantial part of the land where it is found, it might be
considered an integral part of that land. See cases cited supra note 58.
70. Even after Congress authorized entry under the mining laws to public lands containing
petroleum or other mineral oils, the status of oil shale claims remained unresolved because the
claims technically did not contain oil. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 659 n.3 (1980). Per-
haps tar sands might be treated less questionably given that they are sands permeated with oil. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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cause a lease usually contains provisions which describe the development
of the minerals granted.71 Often, however, the instrument itself is ambig-
uous and courts must speculate as to what unnamed minerals the parties
intended to convey in addition to the named minerals.72 There are three
other ways courts may analyze an ambiguous instrument in an attempt
to ascertain the intenions of the parties to a conveyance,
E. Specific/General Intent
The specific/general intent test provides that when a grant or reser-
vation is made of all minerals without qualifying language, it should be
assumed that the parties generally intended to sever the entire mineral
estate from the surface estate. Furthermore:
[T]he severance should be construed to sever from the surface all sub-
stances presently valuable in themselves, apart fom [sic] the soil,
whether their presence is known or not, and all substances which be-
come valuable through development of the arts and sciences, and that
nothing presently or prospectively valuable as extracted substances
would be intended to be excluded from the mineral estate.73
Two limitations qualify this presumption. First, it is not applicable to
conveyances which exhibit a specific intent.74 Second, some form of
71. See generally Lopez, supra note 33, at 999. In Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey,
15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), a Texas court considered a lease conveying "all oil, gas, and
other minerals." The lease further granted the right to erect derricks, build tanks, and lay pipe lines.
The court concluded that the parties did not intend to lease rights to gravel since the lease's provi-
sions addressed methods of oil and gas production, and made no provision for the mining of gravel.
Id. at 700. See also Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973) (intention of the parties to a
lease which conveyed rights to "dig, drill, operate for and procure natural gas, petroleum and other
mineral substances" was to restrict its scope to the exploration and production of oil, gas, and re-
lated minerals, and not to grant rights to coal, clay, gypsum, or limestone). Sometimes, the royalty
clause in a lease helps to explain what substances are to be included in the term "other minerals."
Reeves, supra note 32 at 452-53.
72. Perhaps courts should distinguish leases from deeds, and refrain from applying general
rules of interpretation to leases which obviously contemplate the development of certain minerals,
and assume instead that the parties intended to limit the grant to the minerals capable of being
developed by those methods. See Clark, Uranium Problems, 18 TOx. BAR J. 505, 537-38 (1955);
Note, Beneath the Surface-Destruction Test: The Dialectic of Intention and Policy, 56 TEx. L. REV.
99 (1977).
73. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 113 (1949). See
also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Guild Trust, 461 F. Supp. 279 (1978), aff'd, 636 F.2d 261, cert. denied,
Guild Trust v. Amoco Prod. Co., 452 U.S. 967 (1981); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
This test differs from the use of parole evidence to determine either the subjective or objective intent
because it presumes a general intent instead of trying to ascertain an unexpressed specific intent. See
supra notes 56-62 and accompanyng text.
74. Kuntz, supra note 73, at 114. Some courts have gleaned a specific intention of the parties to
limit the conveyance and have excluded other substances. See, e.g., Rock House Fork Land Co. v.
Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684 (1918) (clay excluded in reservation which
contemplated the mining of coal); Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141
N.E. 537 (1923) (gravel excluded from grant which contemplated underground mining operations);
[Vol. 22:1
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compensation must be paid to the surface owner for those substances
which cannot be removed without unreasonable injury to the enjoyment
of the surface.7"
With respect to oil shale and tar sands, a key attribute of this defini-
tion of minerals is that it includes substances "which become valuable
through development of the arts and sciences.",7 6 Indeed, the commer-
cial development of western shale is recent, and the potential develop-
ment of eastern shale is still being explored. It appears this test would
include shale in the mineral estate, although compensation might be due
the surface owner because its development arguably causes unreasonable
injury to the enjoyment of the surface.77 The Supreme Court recognized
the prospective value of oil shale in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.78 In that
case, the Court determined that oil shale claims made before the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920,79 which withdrew oil shale from discovery under
the general mining laws, were valid even though shale at the time of the
claims had no present marketability.8 0 The Court reviewed the legisla-
tive history of the Act and concluded that Congress did not consider
present marketability to be a prerequisite to the patentability of oil
shale.81 Andrus, of course, involved statutory interpretation. However, a
Fisher v. Keweenaw Land Ass'n, 371 Mich. 575, 124 N.W.2d 784 (1963) (gravel and sand not
included in reservation which contemplated the mining of metallic ores or metal bearing minerals).
The court in Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., of Ky., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59
A.L.R.3d 1137 (1973) recognized the specific/general intent test but apparently applied it incor-
rectly. That court concluded that the only general intent of the parties was to transfer an interest in
oil and gas, and not to sever the entire mineral estate. Id. at 514. The court further concluded that
because there was no specific intent to convey coal, it was not included in the term "other minerals."
Id. at 513. Applying the specific/general intent test, however, would lead to the conclusion that coal
was included in the severance absent a specific limitation of the conveyance of oil and gas. The
instrument need not exhibit a general intent to sever the mineral state. That intent is presumed
absent a contrary specific intent.
75. Kuntz, supra note 73, at 113, 115.
76. Id. at 113. Cf. McKinney's Heirs v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W.
314 (1909) (natural gas and rights associated with its development not mentioned in deed of miner-
als, therefore general intent of the parties was not to convey gas). See also infra notes 132-40 and
accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
78. 446 U.S. 657 (1980).
79. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-193 (1982).
80. For a discussion of this case and its history, see Comment, Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.: The
Marketability Standard and the Oil Shale Exception, 58 DEN. L.J. 453 (1981); Duncan, supra note 9;
Israel, supra note 11. See also Reidy, Do Unpatented Oil Shale Mining Claims Exist?, 43 DEN. L.J.
9 (1966) (historical analysis and discussion of the positions of the government and the mining claim-
ants before Andrus decision).
81. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 663 (1980). The present marketability standard
requires, for the issuance of a patent, that minerals "can be 'extracted, removed and marketed at a
profit.'" United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 600 (1968). The Andrus decision has been criti-
cized on several grounds. See, eg., Comment, supra note 80, at 462-63 (validation of claims will not
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federal court examined this decision in Lazy D Grazing Association v.
Terry Land and Livestock Co.2 and concluded that private parties in-
tended to reserve coal in a reservation of "all gas, casinghead gas, oil and
other minerals valuable as a source of petroleum.""3 The court affirmed
the trial judge's finding that the conveyance embraced minerals which
had prospective value at the date of the severance, such as coal and oil
shale.8 4 Although neither decision is directly on point, both support the
contention that oil shale and tar sands could have sufficient prospective
value to fall within the severed mineral estate if a court applies the spe-
cific/general test."
F. Surface Destruction
The caveat to the specific/general intent test which addresses the
method of extracting the mineral in relation to the surface influences a
court's interpretation of the word minerals under another analysis, the
"surface destruction" test. Under this test, courts deduce that a broad
grant or reservation of a mineral interest does not include a substance
which can only be extracted by destroying the surface, reasoning that
interpreting the term otherwise would leave the surface owner with noth-
ing.86 Thus, this analysis generally presumes that parties to a severance
of estates would not intend for the surface estate to be destroyed, for
example, by strip mining.87
promote government policy of development); Duncan, supra note 9, at I (decision fails to resolve
uncertainties of title); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 674 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (no evi-
dence government intended to exclude oil shale claims from present marketability standard).
82. 641 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 845.
84. Id. at 845-46. Moreover, the appellate court noted that coal, at the time of the dispute, was
not valuable because it was not competitive with other sources of energy, but resolved that under
certain circumstances it could become valuable. Id. at 847.
85. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a substance which would not fall within the mineral estate
because disputes as to ownership arise only after the value of a substance's extraction is discovered.
86. See generally Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) (reservation of "the
mineral rights" did not include limestone, removal of which would result in the virtual destruction
of the surface); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (rex. Civ. App. 1962) (limestone not included
in grant of "oil, gas and other minerals" because its removal by open pit or quarrying methods
would render the surface useless for ranching or farming), writ refrd; Christensen v. Chromalloy
Am. Corp., 99 Nev. 34, 656 P.2d 844 (1983) (preliminary injunction issued to enjoin removal of
barite which could belong to the surface estate because its extraction would consume, deplete, or
destroy the surface estate).
87. Some courts scrutinize this general intent more closely to examine whether the parties spe-
cifically contemplated deep mining as opposed to strip mining. See, e.g., Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas
Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 (1974) (language of deed particularly applicable to deep
mining, and technique of strip mining unknown when conveyance of "all coal" made); Stewart v.
Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970) (provisions in grant of "all coal" referred to ventilation,
a feature of deep mining, and no evidence that strip mining being conducted in area at time of grant);
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Texas courts refined and grappled with this rule perhaps more than
any other state's courts.88 In Acker v. Guinn,89 the Texas Supreme Court
ruled as a matter of law that "[u]nless the contrary intention is affirma-
tively and fairly expressed ... a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or
'mineral rights' should not be construed to include a substance that must
be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or deplete the sur-
face estate." 90 Subsequently, the court in Reed v. Wylie91 refined the test
and held that if at the date of the grant or reservation, the substance near
the surface only could have been extracted by a method which would
have destroyed the surface, then it belonged to the surface owner.92
Upon reconsideration, the court in Reed v. Wylie (II) 9 further tailored
the test, and held that a deposit within two hundred feet of the surface
would be considered near the surface as a matter of law.94 The court also
changed the inquiry regarding the method of removal to whether any
Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1981) (because strip mining for coal in region not used
at time of reservation of "all oil, gas, saline and mineral substances" made, strip mining could not
have been within the contemplation of the parties); West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129
W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947) (broad form deed of mining rights which referred to rights to dig
and to excavate did not include right to strip mine); White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 1065
(1910) (limestone which could only be removed by quarrying not included in a reservation of "mines
and minerals" which referred to the business of mining and removing ores and minerals. But cf
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903) (definition of minerals not aided by distinguish-
ing substances which are mined from those which are quarried); Lazy D Grazing Ass'n v. Terry
Land & Livestock Co., 641 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981) (no evidence that strip mining of coal would
result in substantial destruction of surface); Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W. 2d 543, 70 A.L.R.3rd
366 (N.D. 1973) (strip mining of lignite not destructive of surface because state law required recla-
mation). Other courts have looked to the nature of the mineral conveyed and the common means of
extracting such mineral to determine the parties' intent. Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390,
102 A.2d 893 (1954) (to permit strip mining was the more rational interpretation of "all the coal...
in... the surface of said land" since the coal on the surface could not be removed by deep mining).
Oftentimes, courts will use the surface destruction test in conjuction with other interpretive tools in
an effort to define minerals. See, eg., Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954)
(construction against attorney-grantor and extrinsic evidence to establish objective intent); Heinatz
v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) (special value); Christensen v. Chromalloy Am.
Corp., 99 Nev. 34, 656 P.2d 844 (1983) (parole evidence).
88. For a discussion of the significant Texas cases, see generally Note, Abandonment of the
Surface Destruction Test in Determining the Ownership of Unnamed Minerals: Moser v. United
States Steel Corp., 15 TEx. TECH L. Rnv. 699 (1984); Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral - The
Surface Destruction Test and More, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 879 (1977); Note, Ownership of Lignite
Under a General Reservation of Mineral Rights: Acker v. Guinn Applied, 15 Hous. L. REv. 187
(1977); Note, Mines and Minerals-Mineral Reservation, 9 ST. MARY'S L.. 624 (1978); Note, supra
note 55, at 358-69. Note, supra note 72.
89. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
90. Id. at 352.
91. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977), overruled, Reed v. Wylie (II), 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
92. Id. at 172. Furthermore, if any part of the substance met this criterion, then all of the
substance, at whatever depth it occurred, belonged to the surface estate. Id.
93. 597 S.W.2d 743 (rex. 1980).
94. Id. at 748.
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reasonable method of extraction, at the time of the opinion, would have
destroyed the surface.95 If the surface-destructive method is reasonable,
the mineral is to be included in the surface estate.
The production of oil shale and tar sands would probably be consid-
ered surface destructive if produced through surface mining." If they
were produced by the room and pillar method of mining, then maybe
not.9 7 However, the disposal of spent shale on site may be deemed sur-
face destructive.98 On the other hand, in situ processes 99 are not neces-
sarily surface destructive,"° although some minor interference with the
surface estate may occur. Of course, if a court followed the Reed refine-
ments of Acker, the ownership of shale might depend upon such fortui-
tous conditions as its metered distance to the surface and the state of the
art of mineral development when litigation commences.
G. Ordinary and Natural Meaning of the Word "Mineral"
Finally, some courts define minerals in ambiguous grants or reserva-
tions as all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of the
word.101 The precise legal meaning of this phrase is elusive, 10 2 except
95. Id. at 747. A rigid application of the surface destruction test leads to an anomalous result.
The Acker and Reed courts acknowledged that the substances in question, ore and lignite, were
minerals, Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172
(Tex. 1977), but denied the mineral owner the right to develop them. In other words, the mineral
owner owns minerals. Iron ore and lignite are minerals, but the mineral owner possesses no right to
enjoy them. Is the surface estate then expanded to include some minerals? Or are these minerals
"undevelopable"?
96. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The surface mining of shale, like limestone
and coal, requires the removal of the overburden which tends to destroy the surface. See generally
Nevill, Multiple Uses and Conflicting Rights, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 783, 784-85 (1982); Heinatz v.
Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994, 996 (1949). The mining of shale close to the surface through
open pits has been found to be surface destructive. Bibby v. Bunch, 176 Ala. 585, 58 So. 916 (1912).
See also Carson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948) (the extraction of alu-
mina from bauxite, a clay formation which is mined by the digging of open pits, is surface destruc-
tive); Storm Assocs. v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579 (rex. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, Friedman v.
Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985) (evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that strip
mining of uranium was a reasonable means of extraction and would deplete the surface).
97. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
100. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex.Civ. App. 1980) (only
reasonable method of mining uranium at the time of trial was by in situ leaching, a process that did
not result in substantial destruction of the surface), aff'd on other grounds, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.
1984).
101. See, eg., Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97 S.W.2d 35 (1936); Elkhorn City Land Co. v.
Elkhorn City, 459 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1970); Little v. Carter, 408 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1966). Some courts
use this test in conjunction with another analysis. See, eg., Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (special value); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) (special
value and surface destruction), afftg Allen v. Heinatz, 212 S.W.2d 987 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Hol-
land v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975) (special value).
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that it rejects a scientific or technical definition. 10 3
Texas recently adopted this approach in Moser v. United States Steel
Corp. " with some qualifications. 105 In doing so, the court held that
some substances such as limestone, caliche, surface shale, sand, and
gravel would be excluded from this definition of minerals as a matter of
law.'0 6 The court also retained the surface destruction test of the Acker-
Reed trilogy for iron ore and near surface lignite.'07 Thus, under Texas
law, it seems that there is nothing ordinary or natural about the meaning
of minerals.108 "Common substances" are excluded from ambiguous
grants or reservations of minerals possibly along with iron ore and coal,
while uranium might be included within those conveyances, depending
upon what judicial pronouncement was in effect at the time the deed or
102. Science divides all matter into three kingdoms: animal, plant, and minerals. The ordinary
and natural meaning of minerals, however, must exclude more substances than this broad, scientific
classification would embrace, or a grant or reservation of "minerals" would include even the soil
itself. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 659 (rex. Civ. App. 1947). One author suggests that the
meaning may be established by looking to the substance's chemical composition and the meaning of
minerals as used in the mining industry, the commercial world, and by landowners. Note, supra
note 55, at 363-64. If the ordinary and natural meaning concentrates on the substance's value apart
from the soil, then this analysis would approximate that of the special value test. See supra text
accompanying notes 64-68. If this definition were not limited to the ordinary meaning of the word
minerals at the time of the grant or reservation, then this analysis would approximate the specific/
general intent analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
103. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
104. 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (uranium is a mineral within the ordinary and natural
meaning of the term). See generally Note, Moser v. United States Steel Corp.: Owners of "Other
Minerals" Hit Pay Dirt as Texas Buries Acker-Reed Surface Destruction Test, 5 J. ENERGY L. &
POL'Y 147 (1983); Note, supra note 55. This case represents a return to earlier cases which ex-
pounded the ordinary and natural meaning definition of minerals. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512,
217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (rex. Civ. App. 1962).
105. If the removal of a substance defined as a mineral under the ordinary and natural meaning
test would interfere unreasonably with surface use, some compensation may be required. See infra
notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
106. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984). The decision essen-
tially reflects the opinion of the dissent in Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel,
J., dissenting).
107. Id. An earlier decision, Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Cr. J. 427 (1983),
which was withdrawn, did not exclude these substances expressly. In fact, in the time between the
earlier decision and the final Moser pronouncement, an appellate court found coal and lignite to be
minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term. Schwarz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822,
823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983), aff'd, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986). Schwarz involved a state claim to
coal under a reservation in a land grant. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
decision after the final Moser decision, not on the grounds that coal was a mineral within the ordi-
nary and natural meaning of the word, but on the grounds that legislative grants must be strictly
construed in favor of the state. Hence, coal and lignite were reserved to the state regardless of
whether the recovery of these substances would destroy or deplete the surface estate. Schwarz v.
State, 703 S.W.2d 187, 189 (rex. 1986).
108. Accord Brooks, What To Do About Those Pesky Mineral Interests: The Dominant Mineral
Estate From the Surface Developer's Point of View, 48 TEx. BAR J. 1262, 1264 (1985) (Part 2) [here-
inafter cited as Brooks II].
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lease was executed. 10 9
How oil shale or tar sands would be classified according to the ordi-
nary and natural meaning of the word minerals is difficult to predict. If
the attributes they share with such common substances as limestone,
sand, or gravel were emphasized, they probably would not be classified as
minerals." 0 Additionally, courts often augment this general inquiry
with another analysis, such as the surface destruction, special value, or
specific/general intent tests,"' which serves to further confuse the issue.
In sum, courts use a variety of interpretative tools in an attempt to
establish the intent of the parties to an ambiguous grant or reservation of
minerals. This array of judicial principles yields no logically consistent
result regarding how a given substance such as oil shale Will be defined.
Hence, the ownership of certain substances remains in dispute. Yet, the
issue of who owns the rights to develop a substance does not terminate
with the classification of the substance.
V. THE RESPECTIVE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE MINERAL AND
SURFACE OWNERS
Generally, the mineral estate is considered to be the dominant es-
tate, and the surface estate the servient estate." 2 As a result, the mineral
owner enjoys an implied easement over the surface in order to exploit the
mineral rights free from interference by the surface owner.'1 3 This im-
plied easement is limited to that use which is reasonably necessary to
109. The Moser decision is only applicable to severances made after June 8, 1983. Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984). In a case decided subsequent to Moser,
the court held that the same substance in question, uranium, belonged to the landowner under the
law in effect at the time, because its extraction would consume, deplete, or destroy the surface of the
land. Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W. 2d 586 (Tex. 1985), aff'g Storm Ass'n, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). Thus, as the dissenting judge in Friedman intimated, a
great deal of title uncertainty remains with respect to minerals. Friedman, 645 S.W.2d at 589 (Ray,
J., dissenting).
110. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
111. In addition to recognizing traces of the special value and surface destruction tests, the
Texas Supreme Court in Moser purported to adopt the specific/general intent test. Moser v. United
States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984). Given the practical confusion as to the status of
minerals in Texas, however, it is difficult to ascertain how this analysis contributes to the definition.
112. See generally Brooks, What To Do About Those Pesky Mineral Interests: The Dominant
Mineral Estate From the Surface Developer's Point of View, 48 TEX. BAR J. 1138 (1985) (Part 1)
[hereinafter cited as Brooks I]; Lopez, supra note 33, at 1003-14. But cf Bibby v. Bunch, 176 Ala.
585,-.., 58 So. 916, 917 (1912) (right to mine shale, a mineral, is servient to the right of the owner of
the surface to have it perpetually sustained in its natural state).
113. Concomitantly, the surface owner enjoys the right to subjacent support. See generally,
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enjoy the rights incidental to mineral ownership." 4 Exceeding the
boundaries of reasonable use through excessive use, negligence, or willful
misconduct may give rise to a cause of action by the surface owner for
damages.' 15  Furthermore, Texas, in the previously discussed Moser
case, 116 extended the mineral owner's liability for damages to non-negli-
gent, non-excessive uses, causing surface destruction when the substance
exploited was an unnamed mineral in a general grant or reservation of
"other minerals." '17 This notion of expanded liability derives from what
is known as the "accommodation," or "due regard," doctrine which is
recognized in some jurisdictions.1 18 That doctrine somewhat diminishes
the dominance of the mineral estate, and requires the mineral owner to
choose a less onerous method of development than the one preferred, one
which interferes less with the enjoyment of the surface, if such a method
is reasonably available." 9
114. See generally Nevill, supra note 96. See also wall v. Shell Oil Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 504, 25
Cal. Rptr. 908 (1962); Harris v. Currrie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943), aff'g Currie v. Harris,
172 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521 (rex. 1980); Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967). The civil law of Louisiana does not recognize
servient and dominant estates per se. Rather, the law addresses the notion of reasonable use as the
correlative rights and obligations of the landowner and the servitude (mineral) owner. See generally
Delahoussaye v. Landry, 3 La. Ann. 549 (La. 1848). Some courts seem to blur the distinction be-
tween ownership and the reasonable use of owned rights, and require an affirmative showing of a
grant to strip mine, arguably an unreasonable use of the surface. See, e.g., Stewart v. Chenicky, 439
Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374
(1974); Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
115. An unreasonable use could involve damages to improvements, standing timber, or growing
crops. See Brooks I, supra note 112, at 1141. However, exactly what conduct would give rise to an
action for damages remains uncertain. In reality, the mineral owner or his lessee would be advised
to settle this issue in advance with surface owner. See generally Brooks II, supra note 108, at 1264-
66; Nevill, supra note 96, at 799; Day, Relative Rights of the Surface Owner and the Owner or Lessee
of the Mineral Estate, 30 LANDMAN 41, 45 (Oct. 1985). Addtionally, absent a statutory or contrac-
tual provision, there generally is no obligation on the part of the mineral owner to restore the sur-
face. But see Smith v. Schuster, 66 So.2d 430 (La. App. 1953) (mineral lessee must restore the
surface even though the lease contract is silent).
116. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). See also supra notes 104-
109 and accompanying text.
117. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984). The court retained the
limitation on liability to negligently inflicted damage to, or excessive use of, the surface estate when
the substance exploited was conveyed expressly. Id. It justified this difference in treatment by not-
ing that:
It is reasonable to assume a grantor who expressly conveys a mineral which may or must
be removed by destroying a portion of the surface estate anticipates his surface estate will
be diminished when the mineral is removed. It is also probable the grantor has calculated
the value of the diminution of his surface in the compensation received for the conveyance.
This reasoning is not compelling when a grantor conveys a mineral which may destroy the
surface in a conveyance of "other minerals."
Id.
118. See generally Brooks I, supra note 112, at 1138; Lopez, supra note 33, at 1007-10; Nevill,
supra note 96, at 787.
119. See, eg., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (rex. 1971) (mineral lessee required to use
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Such restrictions could constrain the development of oil shale and
tar sands even if courts classified these substances as minerals. 120  The
production of shale requires large amounts of water and the completed
retorting process yields contaminated waste water. 121 Disputes may arise
over the rights to this water,122 generally not classified as a mineral, 123 as
well as over the method of its disposal after use. 124 Additionally, ques-
tions may arise regarding the reasonable disposal of the significant vol-
ume of solid waste produced from shale mining activities, as well as over
the obligation of the mineral owner, if one exists, to restore the surface by
revegitation. 125
Arguably, inherent in the various analyses courts employ to classify
substances as minerals are policy considerations guised as attempts to
ascertain the intent of the parties to a severance of the mineral estate.
Certainly, the recognition of the respective rights and duties of the own-
ers of severed estates in the enjoyment of the interest owned demon-
strates that ownership is not equated absolutely with the right to develop.
Competing uses must be accommodated. Whether the present jurispru-
dence adequately achieves this accommodation in an equitable, efficient,
and predictable manner is a matter of debate.
reasonable, though more costly, alternative to reciprocating pumps, which interfered with surface
owner's irrigation system); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976) (damages
awarded to surface owner for injury to crops when reasonable alternative existed for location of
access road); Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979) (surface owner must be
permitted to show reasonable alternative existed for mineral owner's seismic exploration). The key
inquiry is whether reasonable alternatives exist, not whether any other alternative exists. See Sun Oil
Co. v. Whitacker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (lessee's implied right included the right to use as
much water from surface owner's undergound water as reasonably necessary for secondary recovery
operations).
120. Much of eastern shale is located in populated areas or land used for farming. See Survey,
supra note 7, at 15.
121. See generally McCloskey, supra note 24, at 4; GUIDE, supra note 16, at 17; CHEMICAL
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 350.
122. For a discussion of rules governing the ownership, prior appropriation, and dewatering of
ground water, see Lopez, supra note 33, at 1025-27. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Whitacker, 483 S.W.2d
808 (Tex. 1972) (accommodation doctrine and use of water).
123. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
124. For a discussion of the disposal of waste or salt water produced by drilling, see Ellis v.
Arkansas La. Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980); Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., 188 Okla. 690, 112 P.2d 792
(1941).
125. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See also CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6,
at 351; GuIDE, supra note 16, at 14-15. Revegitation can be difficult and costly because it requires
mulching, fertilization, and irrigating, along with increasing the amount of top soil. Id. at 15.
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VI. A PROPOSAL FOR BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO AN
UNNAMED SUBSTANCE IN A GENERAL GRANT OR
RESERVATION OF MINERALS
As part IV of this article has revealed, courts have struggled in vain
to fairly, consistently, and adequately define the rights and responsibili-
ties of the surface estate and mineral estate owners when the estate has
been severed and development of new "minerals" is sought.12 6 When
courts render that ultimate decision, many times the enriched party
stands in a remote relationship to the parties to the original severance.
Of course, purchasers for value should be able to rely on the validity of
their titles. But in reality, does our present jurisprudence provide any
assurance as to what actually is owned? Should the legal system, in ret-
rospect, speculate upon the unspecified intent of the parties to a sever-
ance, perhaps far removed from the litigants, in order to vest ownership
rights in that litigant who owns the appropriate estate?
127
Indeed, the classification of rights to unnamed substances as being a
part of the mineral or surface estate suggests that there is some geograph-
ically delineated subsurface boundary. This analysis blurs the real issue,
which is determining the relative rights of the parties to enjoy the land,
without any mystical demarcations.1 28 Courts have recognized correla-
tive rights to enjoyment by imposing an easement over the surface in
favor of the mineral estate, limited to reasonable use.129 However, this
corollary is logically inconsistent with the premise of absolute ownership
of estates. If one owns a substance as part of a dominant estate, why
must compensation be paid to possess it? Moreover, recognizing this bi-
furcated interest of an estate coupled with an easement seems to ignore
the fact that an easement is capable of being abandoned, even though a
corporeal mineral estate cannot be abandoned by its owner. 130 If this
easement of reasonable use originated at the severance of the estates, an
126. See supra notes 50-111 and accompanying text.
127. One court observed: "It is equally plain that it would be destructive of the security of deeds
if the rights of purchasers for value should be made to depend on the intention in the mind of remote
vendors that was not expressed in the conveyance, and of which intention they had no acual notice."
Hudson v. McGuire, 188 Ky. 712, -, 223 S.W. 1101, 1105, 17 A.L.R. 148, 155, (Ky. Ct. App.
1920). This criticism may not be applicable to leases. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
128. Harrell, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N, 311, 321-25 (1979).
129. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of the abandonment of mineral interests, see generally I WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 210.1 (1985). California, a non-ownership in place jurisdiction, clas-
sifies mineral interests as incorporeal hereditaments which are capable of being abandoned. See
Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 882-83, 442 P.2d 692, 707-08, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 627-28 (1968).
19861
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argument could be made that it could subsequently be terminated for
non-use. Yet, courts have not examined this possibility."'
Rather, the issue has revolved around defining the contents of the
estate and trying to ascertain the unspecified intent of the parties. Courts
have defined this general intent in two basic ways. First, they have de-
fined it as an intent to sever all substances of value. 132 In the instance of
an owner selling a prosperous dairy farm while reserving "the minerals,"
the question arises as to whether the general intent of the parties to that
transaction is to sell the land for its surface use, or to retain the hope that
minerals will be discovered in the future. In such a situation, the parties
most likely intended to deal with the value of the surface, and not with
the value of speculative mineral developments.1 33
While some courts have considered the value of the surface for agri-
cultural or grazing purposes, other courts apparently have overlooked
this factor in establishing the general intent of the parties.13 4 In the pre-
viously discused Watt case,1 35 the Supreme Court specifically addressed
the issue of congressional intent in severing the minerals from a grant of
homestead rights. Resolving that the decision as to whether a particular
substance was included in the surface estate or the mineral estate should
be made in light of the use of the surface which Congress contem-
plated, 136 the Court concluded that "[s]ince Congress could not have ex-
131. Asume that the argument proves successful and a court holds that an easement incidental
to a mineral estate severed over one hundred years previously was abandoned. Consequently, oil
shale could not be produced by the mineral owner. Does not this extinction of the right suggest that
the original parties overlooked the issue of oil shale ownership nor assign the right to produce it,
intentionally or unintentionally?
132. See supra notes 64-68, 73-75 and accompanying text.
133. See Harrell, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 31 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N. 327, 360-61 (1980). In arguing that lignite was not included in a general reserva-
tion of minerals, one surface owner postulated that:
TO SUGGEST,... THAT 93,000 ACRES OF WOODLANDS, BOUGHT FOR THE
EXPRESS PURPOSE OF SUPPLYING A PAPER MILL, COULD AT ANY TIME
AND FROM TIME TO TIME IN THE INDEFINITE FUTURE, BE STRIPPED OF
THE TREES AT THE WHIM OF A MINERAL OWNER FOR WHATEVER SOLID
MINERAL OR OTHER SUBSTANCE IT MIGHT PROVE DESIRABLE TO MINE,
WOULD HAVE BEEN TOTALLY BEYOND THE COMPREHENSION, INTENT
AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTIES.
Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 379 So. 2d 1117, 1124 (La. App. 1979) (emphasis in original),
rev'd, 404 So.2d 428 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982).
134. Compare Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W. 2d 348 (rex. 1971) (consideration of surface value of
land) with Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W. 2d 169 (rex. 1977) (no examintion of surface value). If it is
desirable to ascertain the true intent of the parties with respect to unspecified minerals, the surface
use at the time of the severance should be a factor to consider. One author advocates retaining any
disputed substance in the surface estate, because to do so deprives the mineral owner of nothing for
which he actually bargained. Note, supra note 72, at 111, 118.
135. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983). See also supra note 65.
136. Id. at 52.
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pected that stockraising and raising crops would entail the extraction of
gravel deposits from the land, the congressional purpose of facilitating
the concurrent development of both surface and subsurface resources is
best served by construing the mineral reservation to encompass
gravel." '1 37 One may only surmise that if, instead, the government
wished to remove gravel and that removal interfered with the con-
tempated surface use, the Court would have reached a different result. 3 '
In a second manner, courts have defined the general intent of the
parties as an intent not to destroy the surface. 139 This approach is neces-
sarily deficient when the surface of the land is void of any apparent use-
fulness at the time of the severance. Then, perhaps both parties are
speculating on the future value of the land for either mineral or surface
development. Such cases require the courts to substitute a questionable
presumption for the general intent of the parties. Thus, in the absence of
a genuinely ascertainable specific intent of the parties to a severence
either to preserve the surface or to exploit the minerals, courts should
admit the obvious, which is that the parties neither granted nor reserved
the substance in question. The only ascertainable general intent in such
cases is that the parties deemed the land to be susceptible to joint
enjoyment.
Joint enjoyment can best be achieved by balancing the interests of
both parties and allowing them to share in the unnamed substance."4
Both parties then would share an interest in the unnamed substance and
anyone wishing to develop it should obtain the right to do so from both
parties. 14' As a result, profits generated by development will not inure
137. Id. at 47.
138. In Watt, a company acquired the homestead grants in order to extract gravel from an open
pit on the premises. Id. at 39.
139. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
140. Alternatively, assigning the unspecified substance to either the mineral or the surface estate
could result in a windfall to one party depending on how courts award compensation for surface
damages. See Note, supra note 88, at 714-15. For a mathematic analysis of the issue, see Note,
supra note 72, at 118-123. This proposition of sharing in the value of production is not without some
precedence. For example, a Texas law requires that money paid for certain minerals reserved by the
state, the extraction of which is usually destructive to the surface, be divided with the surface owner
in lieu of damages, and further allows the surface owner to negotiate the lease. Tax. NAT. REs.
CODE ANN. §§ 53.065-067 (Vernon 1978).
141. As a practical matter, mineral developers often obtain leases or waivers of damages provi-
sions from surface owners, implicitly recognizing the fact that ownership rights are not as exclusive
as courts attempt to make them. One writer, addressing a non-legal audience concerning the legal
limitation on the obligation to pay for damages for negligence or excessive use, commented that:
[N]owhere else does the practical depart so far from the legal in oil and gas operations, as
in the area of payment of damages and surface restoration. Imagine your future as the
landman who said, after tearing out 6 acres of kiwis, "That's tough luck Mr. [insert name
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solely to the owner of the estate arbitrarily thought to contain the sub-
stance. Consequently, those profits will reflect the internalized cost of
obtaining the complete right of exploitation.
Additionally, in some situations, existing surface and mineral uses
may need to be balanced against each other and any proposed new use.
But, regulating competing rights in a reasonable manner is not foreign to
our legal system. 42 The production of oil and gas demonstrates an effort
to adjust vertical correlative rights between neighbors to a common res-
ervoir by pooling and unitization rules. A similar type of horizontal cor-
relative rights could adjust competing rights to an unspecified substance
between owners of severed interests. Also, an appropriate regulatory
body could require permits for development aimed at protecting existing
uses. 143 Currently, laws regulate secondary recovery operations for oil
and gas, drilling within municipal boundaries, and coal and uranium
mining, along with surface reclamation. 1" Once joint ownership is es-
tablished, the equitable distribution of the resource in question could be
achieved with due regard given to balancing competing uses through
regulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts have encountered considerable problems in defining the re-
spective rights of mineral and surface owners to unspecified substances
under general grants or reservations of minerals. Attempting to deter-
mine the elusive, arguably missing, intent of the parties to such a transac-
tion yields inconsistent and unpredictable results. The noted scholar
who first expounded the specific/general intent test for ownership, com-
plemented by the recognition of potential liability for surface damage,
admitted that the most difficult case possible for determining the intent
of largest California landowner you can think of], but you only own the servient surface
estate, and our lawyer says we don't have to pay."
Day, supra note 115, at 45.
142. For example, the government somehow must balance two antagonistic interests in Louisi-
ana in the near future. In the 1970's, the federal government acquired the surface rights on a 17,000
acre national wildlife refuge. However, oil companies previously leased the mineral rights and now
are drilling on the refuge. As a result, a rare type of woodpecker is about to become extinct. In
whatever way one characterizes the intent of the parties to the various transactions, certainly some
balance can be reached between the interests of protecting a natural habitat and exploiting natural
resources. See generally, Petroleum Producers Punch Holes in Woodpecker Refuge, Audubon Ac-
tion, Oct. 1985, at 5.
143. See Olpin, supra note 49, at 792-97, 881-87 for a proposed property regime to regulate
ownership and development rights in geothermal resources.
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DEVELOPING OIL SHALE
of the parties would be the situation where a new substance is discovered
which is found dispersed through, or immediately beneath, the topsoil
and which requires extensive excavation for recovery.1"5 Oil shale and
tar sands embody this difficult case. Are they synthetic sources of energy
or natural resources? Are they minerals? If so, who possesses the right to
exploit them? Should compensation be paid for that right? Certainly,
the temptation to deal with these resources using existing jurisprudence
is alluring. Present jurisprudence, however, does not effectively and eq-
uitably clarify the relationship among opposing owners and should not
be extended to this complex case. Perhaps even its present application to
coal and uranium should be reconsidered. Questions as to ownership
generate title uncertainties and frustrate developmental efforts. While
the capacity to commercially develop these resources may be years away,
when that opportunity materializes, the legal system should be prepared
to deal with potential ownership disputes in a logical, consistent, and
equitable fashion without vacillation. Undoubtedly, capturing these
sources of energy will be regulated pervasively because of environmental
impacts. Perhaps the equilibrium reached between environmental con-
cerns and the need for energy sources could be translated into an equilib-
rium among owners of the surface and subsurface estates. If regulation
fails to provide an equitable solution, the legislative bodies or the courts
should be prepared to define the rights of the owners of the surface and
subsurface estate by balancing the rights of the parties and equitably ap-
portioning the unnamed substance between them.
145. Kuntz, supra note 73, at 115.
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